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CHAPTER 8 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND BREXIT:  
A RETREAT OR A REAFFIRMATION OF JURISDICTION?

 
 
Luke McDonagh and Marc Mimler* 
Intellectual Property Law and Brexit 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The effect of European Union law on intellectual property (IP) law in the United Kingdom 
has been profound. There is no area of IP law that does not feature EU legislation or CJEU 
case law. In fact, it may be the most ‘Europeanised’ area of private law.1 For this reason, 
‘Brexit’ will undoubtedly have a massive impact on the current IP framework in the UK. A 
clear picture of the post-Brexit IP landscape, however, can only be drawn once we know the 
outcome of the negotiations pursuant to the Article 50 TEU procedure. Our intention with 
this chapter is to give an overview of the current state of play in terms of EU law’s impact on 
IP law, and to consider the most likely outcome of Brexit on IP law in the UK. 
At the outset, we must emphasise that the United Kingdom’s ‘exiting’ of the 
European Union will primarily affect IP laws, currently valid in the UK, that derive from EU 
measures. Long before the UK joined the then European Economic Community (EEC) in 
1973 it had established its own national jurisdiction to grant, for example, trade marks and 
patents, and it will continue to possess this jurisdiction, post-Brexit. Moreover, the UK can 
claim an indigenous tradition of copyright legislation going back to the Statute of Anne in 
1710. Finally, the UK is a signatory to several measures which have been negotiated and 
agreed outside of the European Union, and which need to be distinguished from EU 
measures. For instance, there is the UPOV Convention establishing a sui generis right for 
plant varieties, as well as the European Patent Convention (EPC) which provides for a 
centralised system for granting European patents (EPs). These measures operate outside the 
ambit of the European Union and Brexit will not directly affect the UK’s involvement in 
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these measures. With this chapter, we aim to explain what areas will be affected by Brexit, 
and which ones will not. 
 
2.  THE INTEGRATION OF EUROPEAN IP LAW 
 
The Europeanisation of intellectual property via EU law is a history of ever-growing 
integration. Yet, the Treaty of Rome did not bestow any relevant legislative competence to 
the European Economic Community (EEC). The Treaty rather stipulated that what would 
become EU law would not ‘prejudice the system existing in Member States in respect of 
property’ within its Article 222.2 This meant that efforts to harmonise national IP laws in 
Europe took place at the international level through multilateral measures.
3
 One such measure 
was the Community Patent Convention of 1975 which was devised as a special agreement 
between Member States of the then EEC.
4
  
The European Court of Justice, however, perceived that national rules for IP 
protection and their discrepancies were capable of creating obstacles for fundamental 
principles of the EEC Treaties like freedom of movement of goods or competition.
5
 
Thereafter the scope for scrutiny under rules of the Treaty was enabled by distinguishing 
between the existence of IP rights which were governed by national law and their exercise, 
thus delineating the future relationship between EU law and national IP rights.
6
 The exercise 
of IP rights would fall under the shared scrutiny of the Union and Member States.
7
 Initially, it 
was perceived that national rules on intellectual property would conflict with the competition 
rules in the Treaty,
8
 as early cases indicated.
9
 The focus, however, soon shifted to the adverse 
effects of intellectual property rights on the free movement of goods which led to the 
development of the rules on exhaustion of IP rights by the CJEU.
10
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Additionally, the discrepancies between Treaty principles and national IP rights led 
the European Commission to harmonise national IP laws via Directives based on Article 
114(1) TFEU and its predecessor,
11
 which provided that the Union may provide legislation 
for the establishment and functioning of the internal market.
12
 Directives have been used to 
harmonise national IP laws on trade marks, copyright (and related rights), registered designs 
and, in the patent area, with regards to biotechnology inventions.
13
  
These efforts to harmonise national IP laws have additionally been supplemented by 
unitary EU wide rights through regulations.
14
 Such measures were initially based on Article 
352 TFEU
15
 which required a unanimous vote of the Council. The inception of the Lisbon 
Treaty introduced Article 118 TFEU which allows the introduction of EU-wide IP rights. 
Currently, there are EU Regulations with regards to EU trade mark rights, registered and 
unregistered Community design rights, protected geographical indications and protected 
designations of origin, Community plant variety rights and supplementary protection 
certificates (SPCs). 
One final thing is worth noting: the impact of EU law on national IP rights varies 
from right to right. The effect on design and trade mark law has been profound since both 
areas have been harmonised via Directives and the creation of unitary rights. Copyright law 
has fared less harmoniously but the impact has still been considerable. Patents were, for many 
years, the least affected IP right, but over the past two decades there has been a dramatic 
increase in patent-related EU legislation, culminating in the Regulation on the European 
patent with unitary effect.  
The future framework of intellectual property law in the UK will also depend on the 
kind of Brexit that will occur. A so-called hard Brexit, which currently appears to be the UK 
government’s line, would sever all links with the EU acquis. However, the current 
Government’s White Paper on the Great Repeal Bill states that ‘historic CJEU case law be 
given the same binding, or precedent, status in our courts as decisions of our own Supreme 
Court.’16 The malleability of the common law system will enable UK courts to continue to 
apply EU-derived principles like ‘intellectual creation’ within UK copyright law until new 
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UK legislation provides otherwise. However, any future CJEU case law would not have to be 
followed, though it can be anticipated that UK courts would find CJEU judgments 
persuasive, similar to the current practice with regards to the decisions of the EPO Board of 
Appeals.
17
 ‘Soft Brexit’, ie where the UK stays within the European Economic Area (EEA), 
would mean that many IP Directives would remain valid.  
 
2.1. TRADE MARKS 
 
Of all IP rights, EU law has had the most profound impact on trade mark law. The activity by 
the Union in this field of IP can be explained by the Union’s goal to establish a single 
market.
18
 Trade marks became a prime harmonising area in the context of marketing goods 
and services throughout the single market.
19
 In 1989 the first Trade Marks Directive was 
brought forward with the aim of harmonising trade mark law within EU Member States.
20
 
The United Kingdom implemented the Directive with the UK Trade Marks Act 1994. 
The EU, however, considered that the mere approximation of national laws would not 
eliminate the barriers of territoriality.
21
 To ensure the free movement of branded goods the 
Community Trade Mark was initiated by the European Commission.
22
 The Community Trade 
Mark Regulation created a unitary right – the Community Trade Mark – which would be 
valid in all EU Member States. Following the entry in force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the 
Community Trade Mark Regulation was substituted with the EU Trade Mark Regulation and 
Community Trade Marks were relabelled as EU Trade Marks.  
 
2.1.1.  EU Trade Marks and CJEU Jurisprudence 
 
EU Trade Marks are granted by the EU IP Office (formerly, the Office for the Harmonisation 
in the Internal Market, OHIM) in Alicante. The EU Trade Mark has unitary effect in all EU 
                                                          
17
 Conor v Angiotech [2008] UKHL 49; Human Genome Sciences v Eli Lilly [2011] UKSC 51. See further the 
contribution by T HORSLEY (Ch 4) in this edited collection. 
18
 TRITTON, above n 3, para 3-035. 
19
 A VON MÜHLENDAHL, D BOTIS, S MANIATIS and I WISEMAN, Trade Mark Law in Europe, 3rd edn, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2016, para 2.07. 
20
 First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States 
relating to trade marks [1989] OJ L40.  
21
 Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark [2009] OJ L78/1, 
Recital 4. 
22
 Memorandum on the Creation of an EEC Trade Mark, Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 
8/76, para 34. 
Member States and can only be assigned and licensed as a whole.
23
 The enforcement of such 
EU Trade Marks is conducted by national courts as courts of the EU with the possibility of 
the General Court and the European Court of Justice being involved. Indeed, the majority of 
cases of the CJEU in the field of intellectual property law are trade mark cases.
24
   
European courts are directly involved in the adjudication of EU Trade Marks 
stemming from appeals from the EUIPO. In addition, national courts frequently seek CJEU 
guidance on interpreting provision deriving from the TM Directive through preliminary 
rulings pursuant to Article 267 TFEU. The fact that the substantial provisions of both the 
Directive and Regulation correspond to one another makes case law based on the Directive 
relevant for the interpretation of provisions of the Regulation and vice versa, thus increasing 
the harmonising effect.
25
  
In practice, the decisions of the European courts on trade mark matters have not 
always been welcomed by national courts. Some UK IP practitioners and judges consider that 
the European Courts, as generalist courts, do not have the expertise to decide on a complex, 
specialist matter like trade mark law. UK judicial discontentment can be seen with the High 
Court decision, following a CJEU reference, in Arsenal v Reed (2002)
26
 and similarly, at the 
Court of Appeal level in L’Oréal v Bellure (2009).27 Central to the L’Oréal case was the 
question of whether Bellure was taking unfair advantage of the reputation or the 
distinctiveness of L’Oréal’s marks. The CJEU held that this would occur when the alleged 
infringer was ‘riding on the coattails’ of the famous mark, noting that such use of the mark 
would be uncompensated. The CJEU’s interpretation of the respective provisions left the UK 
courts with no other avenue but a finding of infringement, despite concerns about the wider 
impact of the decision. Indeed, the CJEU’s de facto extension of trade mark protection to the 
wider ‘brand’ has received substantial academic criticism.28  
 
2.1.2.  The Impact of Brexit 
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Article 1(2) of the EU Trade Mark Regulation prescribes that the unitary character of the EU 
Trade Mark shall have equal effect within the Union. A hard Brexit will mean that EU trade 
marks granted by the EUIPO will have no effect within the United Kingdom. The impact of 
this will be significant. Currently, there are millions of EU Trade Marks registered at the 
EUIPO. Moreover, the United Kingdom had, along with Germany, the highest number of 
applications of EU Trade Marks in the year 2015 according to Eurostat.
29
 The fate of these 
registrations remains unclear and would largely depend on any agreement between the UK 
and the remaining EU Member States. The Chartered Institute of Trade Mark Attorneys 
(CITMA) provided a list of seven options that could apply post-Brexit.
30
  
The Jersey option provides that the UK would unilaterally declare EU Trade Marks to 
have effect within the territory of the United Kingdom through an accompanying piece of 
legislation. This effect would be acknowledged by both the UK Intellectual Property Office 
(UK IPO) and UK courts. The UKplus option would foresee an amendment of Article 1(2) of 
the EU Trade Mark Regulation. Rather than extending to the territories of Union Member 
States the effect of such a trade mark would extend to the UK and potentially other non-EU 
European Countries. The Montenegro option envisages that all existing EU Trade Mark 
registrations would be entered automatically entered within the UK’s trade mark register. The 
Tuvalu model follows basically the Montenegro model with the distinction that registration of 
the EU Trade mark in the UK registry would be dependent on the owner’s positive decision 
to extend the protection to the UK. The Veto model resembles the Tuvalu option but provides 
the UK IPO with the option to refuse registration of the mark in question. The Republic of 
Ireland option provides EU Trade Mark owners with the option to create a corresponding UK 
trade mark registration when renewing the registration at the EUIPO or another cut-off date 
after Brexit. Finally, the Conversion model would replicate the currently used system that 
applies where current EU Trade Marks are converted into national trade mark registrations.
31
 
This is, for instance, done where an application for an EU Trade Mark is not possible because 
of an earlier right in just one EU Member State prohibiting registration with an EU Trade 
mark with unitary effect. With regard to applying this framework to the post-Brexit scenario, 
applications would undergo full examination but would be able to retain their initial priority 
date at the EUIPO. 
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‘Hard Brexit’ would mean that national trade mark law (statutory provisions) would 
not have to be amended. The proposed Great Repeal Bill would mean that the current 
statutory trade mark law would remain as it is but Parliament would be able to amend the law 
as it sees fit. Importantly, however, the link to the EU acquis and the adjudication of the 
CJEU will be severed. By contrast, ‘Soft Brexit’ and EEA membership would not change 
much with regard to UK trade mark law as the Trade Marks Directive would still apply. It is 
as yet unclear as to which option will be taken. The current UK White Paper on the Great 
Repeal Bill states that the case law of the CJEU prior to Brexit will have the same status as 
UK Supreme Court cases within the UK legal system,
32
 but subsequent case law of the CJEU 
would no longer be binding on the UK.  
 
2.2. DESIGNS 
 
As with trade mark law, design law in the UK is heavily influenced by EU law. However, 
design protection is multi-layered: designs can be protected through registration at the EU or 
UK levels; but protection is also available through unregistered design rights, again at both 
the EU and UK levels. Unitary EU rights are available for registered and unregistered designs 
(ie Community registered designs and Community unregistered designs), with registrations 
occurring at the EUIPO.
33
 National laws in EU Member States with regard to registered 
rights were harmonised through the Design Directive
34
 which was implemented in the UK 
through an amendment of the Registered Designs Act 1949. The Directive, however, left the 
regime of national unregistered design rights untouched.
35
 UK unregistered designs are 
legislated within Part III of the Copyright, Design and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA 1988). This 
somewhat complex framework of design protection
36
 means that only the law of registered 
designs is fully Europeanised, and the rules for EU and national unregistered designs can 
vary.  
The parallel to the situation under trade mark law means that similar considerations 
and options for the post-Brexit scenario are relevant for the protection of Community 
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registered designs. Hence, CITMA have put forward a similar scenario to the one outlined 
above for trade marks with regards to registered EU designs.
37
 The situation is, however, 
different for unregistered Community designs, where the right subsists automatically when it 
is first made available in the EU.
38
 Post-Brexit, an EU unregistered design right could in 
theory be accepted as a UK unregistered design right. There are difficulties with this, 
however, due to differences between the regimes of protection of unregistered designs in the 
EU and the UK. For instance, the UK right lasts significantly longer (15 years in comparison 
to three years), and contrary to the unregistered Community design, its UK counterpart does 
not protect surface decoration.
39
 Therefore, further considerations will be required in this 
field to develop adequate post-Brexit protection. 
 
2.3.  GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS 
 
Another related field to IP is the protection provided to geographical indications and 
designations of origin. These two fields aim to protect agricultural products and foodstuffs 
manufactured within a certain localitywhich possess certain characteristics. Both of these 
measures are currently based on an EU Regulation.
40
 The protection is granted, inter alia, 
against any false or misleading use of the indication.
41
 Products such as champagne, 
Roquefort cheese, Bavarian Beer and Parma ham are protected by these measures. The UK 
currently has several products registered under this framework such as Welsh Lamb, Stilton 
Blue and White Cheeses, Cornish Pasties and the Melton Mowbray Pork Pie.
42
 
After Brexit, neither Protected Geographical Indications (PGI) nor Protected 
Designations of Origin (PDOs) would have effect in the United Kingdom (similar to the 
situation with EU Trade Marks). This has led to fears that British producers could be free to 
use previously protected names.
43
 Already registered UK products, however, would ironically 
not lose their registration as PGIs or PDO in the EU. This is because the framework 
established by the Regulation is open for products from non-EU Member States. 
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A form of supplementary protection in this area could be provided by the law of 
passing off (an aspect of the law of torts). This would bring the UK back to the situation prior 
to the introduction of the Regulation on PGIs and PDOs, whereby an extended from of 
passing off allowed groups of producers to file an action against misrepresentation by other 
traders. For instance, the producers of Champagne, that were entitled to use the term under 
French law, were able to successfully take action in the UK against producers labelling their 
beverage Spanish Champagne.
44
 
Nevertheless, passing off would not provide the same level of protection as the 
current system. GIs provide protection not just against confusingly similar designations but 
also where association is merely evoked. Conversely, a successful claim of passing off would 
need to demonstrate a misrepresentation, and that consumers would rely on such 
misrepresentation when purchasing the goods of the defendant.
45
 The prospect of divergent 
levels of protection post-Brexit means that a negotiated arrangement as to what happens with 
currently protected GIs is necessary. 
Indeed, any post-Brexit deal between the UK and the EU would very likely deal with 
the issue of currently protected PGIs and PDOs. For one thing, the United Kingdom is 
mandated to provide some form of protection owing to its membership at the World Trade 
Organization. The WTO’s Agreement on Trade related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS), which mandates minimum standards of IP protection, provides in its Article 
22 that legal means to protect interested parties against misleading uses must be provided by 
WTO member states. Aside from this, any future deal with the European Union will 
necessarily involve protections of PGIs and PDOs. The EU places great importance on their 
protection within their trade negotiations as recently observed during discussions over the 
CETA treaty between the EU and Canada.
46
  
 
2.4.  COPYRIGHT 
 
Unlike trade mark law, there is no overarching single regulatory system for EU copyright. 
Nonetheless, major elements of copyright law have been harmonised in the EU via national 
implementation of the following 10 EU Directives: 
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45
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46
 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), Chapter 20, Subsection C. See 
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-Directive on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
information society (‘InfoSoc Directive’).47 
-Directive on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the 
field of intellectual property (‘Rental and Lending Directive’).48 
-Directive on the resale right for the benefit of the author of an original work of art (‘Resale 
Right Directive’).49 
-Directive on the coordination of certain rules concerning copyright and rights related to 
copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission (‘Satellite and Cable 
Directive’).50 
-Directive on the legal protection of computer programs (‘Software Directive’).51 
-Directive on the enforcement of intellectual property rights (‘IPRED’).52 
-Directive on the legal protection of databases (‘Database Directive’).53 
-Directive on the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights amending the 
previous 2006 Directive (‘Term Directive’).54 
-Directive on certain permitted uses of orphan works (‘Orphan Works Directive’).55 
-Directive on collective management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial 
licensing of rights in musical works for online use in the internal market (‘CRM Directive’). 
 
There is insufficient space here to consider all of these legal areas. In the context of Brexit the 
EU-specific rights are of particular interest. One is the sui generis right for databases.
56
 In a 
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hard Brexit scenario, this EU right would no longer be binding in the UK. Post-Brexit, the 
UK could legislate on a national basis to establish a UK sui generis right; or alternatively, the 
courts may fall back on, or expand upon, the UK’s traditional form of protection of databases 
as literary works under copyright.
57
 Another example of an EU-specific right is the artist’s 
resale right.
58
 This right entitles authors of original works of art to a royalty each time one of 
their works is resold through an art market professional. This too would cease to be binding, 
post-Brexit, and the UK would need to legislate to bring in a UK equivalent right (if the UK 
Government wanted this form of protection to continue).  
Yet another interesting point concerns the relevance of the case law of the CJEU.
59
 
This body of case law, post-Brexit, will in principle cease to be binding on the UK (unless 
there is a transitional or longer-term agreement between the UK and the EU that provides for 
the compulsory jurisdiction of the CJEU on copyright). Of particular significance is the EU 
originality threshold of ‘author’s own intellectual creation’ – as put forward by the CJEU in 
Infopaq as the standard for all copyright works.
60
 Since that 2009 case, this test has displaced 
the traditional UK standard of ‘skill, labour and judgment’ (though the impact of this in 
practice has not been dramatic).
61
 It is unknown at this stage whether the UK courts will 
revert to the old understanding of the originality test. Similarly, regarding the CJEU’s 
definition of parody for the purpose of exceptions and limitations, as expressed in the 
Deckmyn case, this will no longer be binding on the UK, post-Brexit.
62
 The UK courts could 
therefore develop their own understanding of parody in the context of the fair dealing 
exception. However, the malleability of the common law means that the UK courts will be 
free to continue to apply the EU-derived tests of originality and parody, post-Brexit, even if 
they are no longer bound by CJEU rulings on copyright matters. Indeed, they may begin to 
develop these tests in ways that differ from the CJEU’s approach.  
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2.5.  PATENTS 
 
Historically, patent law has not been harmonised within the EU. The European Patent 
Convention (EPC) – agreed in 1973 – exists outside the Union and has a wider membership, 
including Turkey, Iceland and Switzerland as well as several other non-EU territories. Under 
the EPC, European patents (EPs) are filed, prosecuted and administered at the European 
Patent Office (EPO) in Munich.  
Even though the primary governing law – the EPC – exists outside of the EU’s 
authority, the EU has, in fact, legislated in several areas relating to patents. The following 
pieces of EU legislation have a direct impact on patents: 
 
- Directive 98/44/EC (biotechnological inventions);
63
  
- Regulation 2100/94 (plant variety rights);
64
  
- Enforcement Directive 2004/48/EC;
65
 
- Regulation 469/2009/EC (SPCs for medicinal products);
66
 
- Directive 2001/82/EC (veterinary medicinal products);
67
  
- Directive 2001/83/EC (medical products for human use);
68
 
- Directive 2009/24/EC (computer programs);
69
  
- Regulation 1257/2012 (UP Regulation).
70
 
 
For present purposes, it is important to concentrate on two elements of the current system: (1) 
the jurisprudence of the CJEU in the above areas, most notably in the areas of biotechnology, 
supplementary protection certificates (SPCs) and enforcement; and (2) the Unified Patent 
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Court and Unitary Patent – a new reformed patent enforcement system for participating EU 
Member States. 
 
 
2.5.1. CJEU Jurisprudence on patent-related matters 
 
Given the limited nature of the above Regulations and Directives, the jurisprudence of the 
CJEU in patent matters is surprisingly wide-ranging. It is not the intention of this part of the 
chapter to give an authoritative overview of CJEU patent case law – instead, three important 
cases in three different areas of EU law are highlighted here to show the breadth of the 
CJEU’s jurisdiction.  
 
2.5.1.1. The Biotechnology Directive (98/44/EC)  
 
The Biotech Directive establishes the rules for the patenting of biotechnological inventions. It 
rules out patentability for inventions that involve ‘uses of human embryos for industrial or 
commercial purposes’. However, the legislators did not give an answer to the politically 
loaded question – exactly what constitutes a ‘human embryo’? Thus, in the Brüstle case the 
CJEU had to answer a series of questions on the meaning of human embryo in the context of 
patenting.
71
 The CJEU ruled in 2011 that Article 6(2)(c) of the Biotech Directive must be 
interpreted as meaning that: 
 
‘The use of human embryos for scientific research purposes is not patentable. A 
‘human embryo’ within the meaning of Union law is any human ovum after 
fertilisation or any human ovum not fertilised but which, through the effect of the 
technique used to obtain it, is capable of commencing the process of development of a 
human being.’ 
 
It is for the referring court to ascertain, in the light of scientific developments, whether a stem 
cell obtained from a human embryo at the blastocyst stage constitutes a ‘human embryo’ 
within the meaning of Article 6(2)(c) of the Biotech Directive. 
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2.5.1.2. Regulation 469/2009/EC (SPCs for Medicinal Products) 
 
This Regulation covers the granting of SPCs – effectively, extending the life of the patent – 
where there was a delay in granting the marketing authorisation for a patented medicine. In 
the case of Arne Forsgren,
72
 the limits of SPC protection were examined by the CJEU. In the 
case, Protein D was present in a vaccine for paediatric use – Synflorix – where it was a 
carrier protein, conjugated by covalent bonds. However, the SPC application was for Protein 
D per se, not in the conjugated form found in Synflorix. The application for the SPC was 
therefore rejected on the basis that Protein D is not present in Synflorix other than as a 
conjugate of other active ingredients as well as the fact that in Synflorix it is an excipient 
rather than contributing to the activity of the vaccine. The CJEU had to consider: 
 
(1) whether an SPC could be obtained in respect to a product per se in ‘separate’ form 
when the marketing authorisation was for a medicine in which the product is 
covalently bonded to other ingredients; and  
(2) whether the SPC could rely on a marketing authorisation which only described the 
product as a ‘carrier protein’ and did not provide any information about an 
independent therapeutic effect 
 
The CJEU found in 2015 that the ‘covalent bonding’ issue should not prevent the granting of 
an SPC. On the issue of whether the marketing authorisation was adequate to support the 
grant of the SPC, the Court stated that for Protein D to be an ‘active ingredient’ as required 
by the Regulation it must produce ‘a pharmacological, immunological or metabolic action of 
its own which is covered by the therapeutic indications of the marketing authorisation’. It left 
that determination – whether to grant the SPC – to the referring court. 
 
2.5.1.3.  The Enforcement Directive (2004/28) 
 
The Enforcement Directive governs the rules for enforcing intellectual property in the courts 
of the EU Member States. In the OTK case the operative question was as follows: does the 
Enforcement Directive prevent Member States from providing in their legislation the 
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possibility to award punitive damages in IP cases?
73
 The Polish Supreme Court sought 
guidance from the CJEU. The CJEU in 2017 ruled that the fact that Directive 2004/48 does 
not entail an obligation on the Member States to provide for ‘punitive’ damages cannot be 
interpreted as a prohibition on introducing such a measure.  
 
2.5.2. The Unified Patent Court (UPC) 
 
Although the grant of patents takes place at a centralised level – at the EPO – European 
patent litigation involving European patents (EPs) is actually undertaken on a largely national 
basis.
74
 The reason is that EPs must be validated – and subsequently, litigated – within 
national jurisdictions.
75
 National courts, therefore, have the ability to issue binding rulings 
concerning patent infringement within their national territories, and they also may consider 
questions of patent validity – although the EPO retains the final say on validity via its patent 
opposition service.
76
 Nonetheless, it is not uncommon for national patent litigation to take 
place at the same time as parallel EPO opposition proceedings; and the lengthy backlog at the 
EPO means that national courts sometimes rule on questions of validity and infringement 
before the EPO Board of Appeals has reached a final decision regarding validity.
77
 This has 
led in some cases to fragmentation of outcomes on validity and infringement across EU 
jurisdictions, something that impacts upon the single market and raises competition issues.
78
  
To try to resolve these issues, on 19 February 2013 the UK and 24 other countries 
signed an intergovernmental agreement (the UPC Agreement) to create a Unified Patent 
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Court (UPC), which will be a new specialist patents court common to participating states.
79
 
Overall, the package of measures is designed to establish and enforce unitary patent 
protection within the European Union,
 80
 with the ultimate ambition of unifying the European 
patent system as much as possible.
81
   
 In addition to the UPC Agreement, the new reform measures also include two EU 
Regulations which establish the European Patent with Unitary effect – also known as the 
Unitary Patent (UP) – and the associated translation arrangements.82 The application and 
grant process for the UP will be the same as for the regular European patents (EPs); the 
option for unitary protection across participating EU Member States comes post-grant.
83
 
Importantly, the UPC will not only hear disputes regarding the validity and infringement of 
the new UPs but also existing and prospective EPs (subject to the transition period).
84
 
 
2.5.3. The Legal Sources of the Unified Patent Court and the UPC 
 
Legally, the existence of the Unitary Patent is enabled by a longstanding option under the 
EPC allowing the validation of patents on a supranational basis.
85
 The EU Regulations were 
passed into law via the system of enhanced cooperation as reformed by the Lisbon Treaty.
86
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The EU Regulations are technically already in force.
87
 However, they will apply only 
once the UPC Agreement is ratified by the requisite 3 + 10 countries, ie Germany, France and 
the UK plus 10 more signatory states. As of March 2017, this ratification has yet to take 
place. Until the Brexit referendum, the UK seemed to be well on the way to full ratification 
of the UPC. Indeed, for the past four years the UK Government has been making plans to 
host one of the new Court’s central divisions in Aldgate, east London, where a building has 
already been leased in preparation for the new Court’s establishment and mock trials have 
taken place.
88
 
What is crucial in the Brexit context is that even though the UPC will have its own 
jurisdiction to rule with respect to most patent issues – like the infringement of patented 
drugs – it must defer to the CJEU in a small number of areas of EU law, arising under the 
areas considered earlier, such as biotechnology, enforcement or matters relating to 
Supplementary Protection Certificates. Under Article 21 of the UPC Agreement a referral can 
be made by the UPC to the CJEU in much the same way as an EU Member State national 
court would make such a referral.
89
 In line with this, the CJEU in Opinion 1/09 held that only 
states that accept the supremacy of EU law and the jurisdiction of the CJEU may sign up.
90
 
Thus, the CJEU will undoubtedly have some judicial input within the UPC system, though 
every effort has seemingly been made by the planners to keep this role to a minimum with 
regard to substantive patent matters.
91
 The experience of the CJEU’s expansive interventions 
in the areas of trade mark law and copyright law within the EU may have had an influence in 
this respect.
92
 
It is here that UK Prime Minister Theresa May’s recent speech on Brexit – she 
reiterated her vow that the UK would, post-Brexit, escape the jurisdiction of the Court of 
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Justice of the European Union (CJEU) – becomes important. Furthermore, the same claim is 
made in the Government’s Brexit White Paper.93  
If the UK is indeed intent on a hard Brexit it is difficult to see how the UK could 
participate in the UPC, which requires accepting that the decisions of the Court of Justice – in 
patent law, at least – will be binding with respect to UPC decisions enforceable in the UK. 
Yet in November 2016, several months after the EU referendum result, the UK Government 
announced that the UK would ratify the UPC Agreement after all. Furthermore, in January 
2017, a mere few days prior to May’s speech, the new UK Minister for Intellectual Property, 
Jo Johnson, stated that the UK still intends to participate in the UPC, emphasising that the 
UPC is an international court rather than an EU one.
94
 The UPC is now expected to be up and 
running by December 2017. 
Though the decision to go for the twin strategy of a hard Brexit while maintaining 
UPC ratification at first appears to make little sense, on further contemplation there may 
actually be some method behind it. In its Brexit White Paper, the Government suggests that 
the creation of new dispute resolution panels or tribunals will be necessary to determine 
questions arising out of whatever agreement the UK and EU reach upon Brexit. The point 
made by Jo Johnson about the UPC being an international court, not an EU one, may not be 
mere rhetoric – it may indicate that the UK is willing to accept the jurisdiction of 
international courts or tribunals, like the UPC, to determine specific legal questions – for 
example, patent matters – that are common to the UK and its ‘new partnership with the 
European Union’ (as referred to in the Brexit White Paper). 
In this respect, the UK Government may consider that although the UPC is bound by 
rulings of the CJEU on a number of EU-related patent matters – and UPC decisions on patent 
injunctions and revocations will be binding within the UK – this is a very different situation 
from that that currently exists under the sweeping jurisdiction of the CJEU, whose decisions 
can have the effect of immediately changing UK domestic law in a wide range of different 
areas.  
If this is the UK Government’s view, then UK UPC ratification makes a lot more 
sense. Indeed, the UK may even see the UPC as a model for the kind of specialist commercial 
court – maintaining a direct but limited link with the CJEU and the wider EU economy – that 
it would be willing to tolerate in its purported new ‘partnership’ with the EU. Of course, we 
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do not know whether the EU would be willing to accept these kinds of bespoke arrangements, 
but the UK’s own intentions may be becoming a bit clearer. 
One final point: the fate of the UK’s continued participation in the unitary patent 
scheme remains less certain. The UP, unlike the UPC, is created by an EU Regulation, and 
there is no way to consider it a purely ‘international right’ (although the existing EP granted 
by the EPO would fit this definition). Accepting the UP would require a more extensive 
assessment of EU law and as yet the UK Government has not given any clues as to its 
intentions. It remains possible that the UK – post-Brexit – will stay within the UPC but not 
the UP. A UK exit from the UP while UPC membership is maintained would mean that UP 
protection would not apply in the UK, but EPs valid in the UK could be litigated at the UPC.  
 
2.6. THE INTERFACE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COMPETITION LAW 
 
The ramifications of Brexit on IP law actually go beyond pure issues of intellectual property. 
The reason is that the interface between competition law and intellectual property is of 
practical importance with regards to the exercise and enforcement of IP rights (which by their 
nature are exclusive rights that can be used against competitors). EU law is of utmost 
relevance here since the EU has competence to legislate in the area of competition law, as 
deemed necessary for the functioning of the internal market pursuant to Article 3(1)(b) 
TFEU. In addition, the substantive provisions within the UK Competition Act 1998 are based 
on the competition law provisions within the TFEU.
95
 
The two main provisions with regards to competition law, Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU, have been applied to sanction certain anti-competitive behaviours of IP right holders. 
Article 101, for instance, prohibits restrictive agreements that could prevent, restrict or distort 
competition within the internal market. In order not to sanction beneficial agreements with 
regards to technology transfer, the EU Commission provides technology transfer block 
exemption regulations which specify which agreements would not fall foul of Article 101 
TFEU.
96
 Article 102 TFEU prohibits the abuse of a dominant position in the market. This 
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can, for instance occur, where an undertaking that has a dominant position on the market 
refuses to license an IP right to a competitor.
97
    
Brexit would mean that the links to the EU acquis would be severed subject to any 
transitional arrangements. Therefore, the impact of Brexit on this utterly ‘European’ field of 
law and its impact on the interface of intellectual property and competition law in the UK 
remains to be seen. A key question that arises with regards to IP practice is the future of so-
called Euro-Defences. Such defences could be applied by a defendant in an IP infringement 
case arguing that a positive finding of infringement could be a violation of the principles 
enshrined within Article 101 or 102 TFEU.
98
 Such defences are often brought forward in 
cases surrounding standard essential patents (patents essential to a technological standard).
99
 
Brexit would undermine the rationale of such defences as stemming from the TFEU. Owing 
to the similarity of the Chapter I and II prohibitions within the Competition Act 1998
100
 with 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU a similar application in future could be applied. Therefore, it can 
be expected that UK competition law practice would closely follow developments within EU 
practice.  
 
2.7. EXHAUSTION 
 
Finally, Brexit would place the doctrine of exhaustion under new scrutiny. As mentioned, IP 
rights have the potential to impair freedom movement of goods under Article 34 TFEU. In 
order to prevent IP rights from impairing this fundamental principle, it was held that once a 
product has been placed on the market with the IP right holder’s consent, he or she was 
prevented from restricting any further circulation, ie the rights were exhausted.
101
 
Importantly, this principle also applies to all states within the EEA pursuant to Protocol 28 of 
the EEA Agreement. Therefore, the current framework presents itself as a system of regional 
exhaustion where IP rights are no longer enforceable once they have been put onto the market 
in the EEA by the right holder, subject to certain exceptions. 
This current system has been criticised since it prevents EU Member States from 
applying a different system of exhaustion.
102
 Soft Brexit, hence EEA membership, would not 
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alter the application of the current EU doctrine of exhaustion in the UK. In the case of a hard 
Brexit, however, the UK could prevent the importation of goods that were put onto the 
market within the EEA; alternatively, the UK could apply principles of international 
exhaustion, which would permit the importation of goods that have been placed onto the 
market anywhere in the world. The specific framework, however, will depend on the outcome 
of the Brexit negotiations.  
 
3. CONCLUSION 
 
There are myriad challenges in untangling the UK from EU intellectual property law. The 
most pressing concern for UK IP holders will be the loss of the EU Intellectual Property 
Office at Alicante, which registers EU trade marks and registered designs. To ensure 
continuity in the protection of trade marks and designs, a new regime to convert existing EU 
rights into UK rights will likely be required, which could stretch the resources of the UK 
Intellectual Property Office. For the other major rights – copyright and patents – the crucial 
issues are only of slightly less consequence. Copyright lawyers will be watching in earnest to 
see if the UK legislates to mirror EU-rights such as the artist’s resale right and the sui generis 
database right, and will be keenly observing how UK judges interpret EU-derived tests for 
concepts such as originality and parody in a post-Brexit environment. In the patent context, 
all eyes are on the Unified Patent Court and the Unitary Patent, as the UK intends, as of 
March 2017, to continue to play a major part in Europe’s new reformed patent litigation 
system. Yet, even if the UK is willing, it cannot be taken for granted that the EU will allow 
the UK, soon to be a non-Member State, to participate in a system specifically tailored with 
the EU single market in mind. There is no doubt that Brexit will be a headache for IP owners 
and legislators, but it also promises to be a fascinating process. 
